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Abstract
Taiwanese Labor, Government Employee, and Farmer Insurance programs provide 5 to 6 months of salary to
enrollees who undergo hysterectomies or oophorectomies before their 45th birthday. These programs create
incentives for more and earlier treatments, referred to as inducement and timing e¤ects. Using National
Health Insurance data between 1997 and 2011, we estimate these e¤ects on surgery hazards by di¤erence-in-
di¤erence and bunching-smoothing polynomial methods. For Government Employee and Labor Insurance,
inducement is 11-12% of all hysterectomies, and timing 20% of inducement. For oophorectomies, both e¤ects
are insignicant. Enrolleesbehaviors are consistent with rational choices. Each surgery qualies an enrollee
for the same benet, but oophorectomy has more adverse health consequences than hysterectomy. Induced
hysterectomies increase benet payments and surgical costs, at about the cost of a mammogram and 5 pap
smears per enrollee.
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We study the e¤ect of disability insurance on the moral hazard of health care use. Disability insurance com-
pensates enrollees for the loss of physical and mental capacities that adversely a¤ect labor market potentials
(Staubli, 2011; Maestas, Mullen and Strand, 2013; French, and Song, 2014). Taiwan adopts comprehensive
employment-based mandatory disability programs. However, the Taiwanese programs include an uncommon
coverage for womens infertility due to i) hysterectomy (surgical uterus removal), ii) oophorectomy (surgical
ovaries removal), and iii) radio-chemo therapy. Enrollees are entitled to a cash benet, equal to about 5 to
6 months of salaries when they undergo these treatments, but the coverage ends at enrollees45th birthday.
Organ dismemberment insurance policies are common. However, we are unaware of evidence that these
policies have causedenrollees to lose a thumb, a toe, an eye, or get an eardrum perforated. Compensations
are almost never high enough compared to the loss disutility. However, the unique Taiwanese programs
a¤ord us the rare research opportunity to examine if disability insurance has caused enrollees to have organ-
removal surgeries.1 Clearly, hysterectomies and oophorectomies are performed based on illness indications,
but may still be performed when severity may not justify surgery. Does disability insurance lead to excessive
treatments that would not have been performed otherwise: an inducement e¤ect? Does disability insurance
lead to treatments being expedited to before the 45th birthday: a timing e¤ect?
Only hysterectomy exhibits signicant inducement and timing e¤ects; oophorectomy does not. About
11-12% of hysterectomies in our sample can be attributed to the inducement e¤ect, and under 20% of
induced surgeries can be attributed to the timing e¤ect. These are striking results. First, the disability
coverage o¤ers the same benets due to hysterectomy or oophorectomy. However, oophorectomy has far
more serious adverse health consequences than hysterectomy (more thorough discussions in Subsection 2.1).
If an enrollee chose to undergo one procedure solely for the disability benet, the preferred procedure would
be the less unpleasant hysterectomy, not oophorectomy. Of course, surgeries should be justied by illness
severity. Inducements separate out unjustied surgeries. And we have only found signicant inducement
1 In Japan, benets due to infertility su¤ered at work are covered, but the Taiwan programs are universal, not
limited to injury at work.
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with hysterectomy. The evidence is consistent with optimizing behavior even when the decision involves a
surgery to remove a major organ.
Second, the disability insurance implementation turns out to be very costly. The Taiwanese already have
national health insurance, so surgery inducement due to disability insurance occurs in addition to moral
hazard due to health insurance. Linking a disability to a surgical procedure creates double moral hazard,
one in the disability claim, and another in health care use. Our results serve as a warning against using a
medical treatment as a qualication for disability benets.
Third, this study sheds some light on monetary incentives and human organs in general. Our evidence
suggests that individuals make consistent choices. The lack of inducement and timing e¤ects in oophorectomy
perhaps is the strongest evidence that for a given price of an organ, individuals reject the o¤er if and only
if the disutility is su¢ ciently high. We have also found that, in the income-stratied samples, induced-
hysterectomy rates are increasing in the benet levels.
We estimate the inducement and timing e¤ects by di¤erence-in-di¤erence and bunching-smoothing poly-
nomial methods. The di¤erence-in-di¤erence design is based on the comparison of enrollees in three disability
insurance programs and those uninsured between 1997 and 2011. The three programs are Labor Insurance,
Government Employee Insurance, and Farmer Insurance. The uninsured are mostly women who are inactive
in the labor force. Our data are from Taiwans National Health Insurance. In addition, we use the Survey
of Family Income and Expenditure (SFIE) to control for socio-demographic and economic factors.
We follow women for 11 years, between their 39th and 50th birthdays. In the main analysis, we include
only enrollees who have not changed their insurance programs in the sample years. We then group enrollees
by their birth cohorts and insurance programs, and calculate the hysterectomy and oophorectomy hazards
for quarters (a 91-day period) before and after the 45th birthday. For each birth cohort, we also use the
average numbers of children and sons, marital status, and household income as covariates.
Our di¤erence-in-di¤erence design is unconventional because there is not a policy change, so no before-
and-after regimes. However, the insured lose the infertility disability benet at age 45. Obviously, the benet
expiration is irrelevant to the uninsured. Our assumption is that the disability insurance e¤ect is muted
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when the enrollees are young. This is because most uterine problems occur past late thirties, so surgeries to
qualify for benets are infeasible until enrollees become older. To operationalize our empirical strategy, we
let the disability benet become a relevant policy intervention when enrollees turn 40 years old. We have
chosen to be cautious: if the deadline had become relevant before the 40th birthday, our assumption would
have yielded di¤erence estimates smaller than the actual di¤erences.
We examine quarter-by-quarter hazard di¤erences between the insured and uninsured, for 20 quarters be-
fore and after expiration. For hysterectomy, Labor Insurance and Government Employee Insurance enrollees
hazards begin to rise rapidly 8 quarters before expiration, but drop rapidly for 2 quarters after. Enrollees in
Farmer Insurance show similar but less pronounced hazard changes. For oophorectomy, these rapid changes
are absent in all insurance programs.
From the estimates we calculate inducement and timing e¤ects. The inducement e¤ect is the total number
of insured enrollees extra surgeries between their 40th and 50th birthdays compared to the uninsured.
The timing e¤ect consists of the total number of surgeries that the insured would have undergone after
the 45th birthday compared to the uninsured. In our sample, Labor Insurance enrollees have a total of
43,845 hysterectomies, and the inducement e¤ect is 5,076 hysterectomies, or about 11.6%. For Government
Employee Insurance, the total is 7,262, and the inducement e¤ect is 789, or 10.9%; the timing e¤ect is about
20% of inducement. For Farmer Insurance, the total is 9,100, and the inducement e¤ect is 347, or 3.8%. No
inducement or timing e¤ects have been found for oophorectomy.
We also use a bunching-smoothing polynomial estimation (see e.g. Saez, 2010; Chetty et al., 2011), which
assumes that surgeries do not happen abruptly over time. We use hazards in benet quarters far from the
45th birthday to t a polynomial. Then we use the tted polynomial to predict the hazards in benet
quarters near the 45th birthday. Any discrepancy between predicted and actual hazards is attributed to
disability insurance. Inducement and timing e¤ects are dened analogously. Bunching-smoothing polynomial
estimation yields inducement and timing e¤ects similar to those in the di¤erence-in-di¤erence method.
As a falsication check, we estimate inducement and timing e¤ects of partial oophorectomy (the removal
of one ovary), and myomectomy (the removal of the inner lining of the uterus). These procedures are used to
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alleviate problems in the female reproductive system, but do not qualify for the infertility disability benet.
We have found no inducement or timing e¤ects for these procedures.
We also consider a number of robustness issues and policy implications. Our primary sample consists of
female enrollees who have not switched insurance programs. For a larger sample, we include those who have
switched between programs. Next, enrollees in the main sample are women aged between 39 and 49 years
old during the period 1997 to 2011. Early cohorts are subject to left censoring; late cohorts, right censoring.
For a smaller sample, we only use data from those with uncensored medical records in the sample period.
We show that our results are robust.
We estimate benet payments and surgery costs induced by disability insurance. We estimate that
on average, the increase in benet payment is about NT$1,410 or US$47 (the exchange rate is US$1 for
NT$30 in 2015) per enrollee, and the hysterectomy cost is about NT$400 per enrollee. For comparison, the
reimbursement rate for mammogram and pap smear are, respectively, NT$1,245 and NT$80. Hence, the
inducement cost is more than enough to pay for 1 mammogram and 5 pap smears for each enrollee.
Age-based insurance benets are quite common. Medicare in the United States provides health insurance
to individuals above 65. Research has shown that patients delay treatment or surgeries until they become
eligible for Medicare (see McWilliams et al., 2003, McWilliams et al., 2007, Card, Dobkin and Maestas, 2008
and 2009). The spike in hysterectomies for insured Taiwanese just before age 45 is consistent with results in
the existing literature, but oophorectomies do not exhibit such a spike.
Our empirical strategies use a modied di¤erence-in-di¤erence regression and a bunching-smoothing
polynomial estimation. Di¤erence-in-di¤erence regression is standard for policy evaluations (see Imbens and
Wooldridge, 2009). Here, we study quarter-by-quarter policy e¤ects, as in Chandra, Gruber, and McKnight
(2010). Autor, Kerr and Kugler (2007) use a similar year-by-year di¤erence-in-di¤erence model to understand
how mandated employment protections reduce productive e¢ ciency. Hoynes, Miller and Simon (2015) also
use the same method to study how earned income tax credit inuences infant health outcomes.
Our bunching-smoothing polynomial estimation is similar to the method for assessing policy discontinuity
e¤ects. For example, taxes can be discontinuously related to reported incomes (Saez, 2010; Chetty et
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al., 2011; Kleven and Waseem, 2013), tax reliefs may be available to couples only if marriages or child
births happen before a deadline (Persson, 2015), or studentstest scores bump up over key grade cuto¤s in
nationwide math tests, and teachers use discretion in their grading to achieve the discrete jumps (Diamond
and Persson, 2016). We use the standard assumption that, absent the policy, the variable of interest should
change smoothly. Our method is more closely related to Diamond and Persson (2016) in that we use
minimum mean-squared errors to determine the manipulated regions and then estimate the counterfactual
surgery polynomials. In addition, we are interested in assessing the enrolleesoverall responses and their
timing, so implementing a regression discontinuity design is inappropriate.
We present the study background in Section 2. Section 3 describes the data, the samples of enrollees, and
sample statistics. In Section 4, we present the two econometric methods. Subsection 4.1 is on the di¤erence-
in-di¤erence method, and Subsection 4.2 is on the bunching-smoothing polynomial method. Two subsections
in Section 5 present estimation results. In Section 6, we consider bigger and smaller samples according to
program-switching and censoring criteria. Next, we stratify Labor Insurance enrollees according to ve
benet levels, to examine inducement variations. Finally, we present inducement social cost estimates. We
draw some conclusions in Section 7. Appendix A contains tables of estimation results; Appendix B contains
plots of actual and counterfactual hazard distributions from the bunching-smoothing polynomial estimation.
2 Background
2.1 Hysterectomy and oophorectomy
Hysterectomy is the surgical removal of a womans uterus, the organ that holds the fetus. This is the second
most common elective surgery among women, after cesarean section for childbirth. Hysterectomies are
performed mainly for uterine broids and malignant tumors, common indications being heavy bleeding, and
serious pain (Department of Health and Human Services, 2011).2 Myomectomy (the surgical removal of some
uterine lining), endometrial ablation (surgical removal of endometrium), pain medication, synthetic steroid
hormones, and pelvic oor exercises are less invasive alternatives. Usually performed by an obstetrician-
2 In a random sample of 658 Taiwanese women, the most common indication for hysterectomy was uterine broids
(at 46.2%), followed by malignancy and pre-malignancy (at 22.2%) (Wu et al., 2005).
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gynecologist, hysterectomy may be abdominal, vaginal, or laparoscopic. The surgery has a mortality rate
below 0.05%. Complications, such as bleeding and dysfunctional uterine parity, are also rare (McPherson et
al., 2004). The length of hospital stay for the procedure ranges from 3 to 5 days.
Hysterectomy incidence rises steadily from ages 30 to 39, peaking between 45 and 49, and declining quickly
thereafter (Huang et al., 2016; McPherson, Gon and Scott, 2013). Incidence rates, measured as hysterectomy
surgeries in a year per unit of population, vary across countries. According to OECD Statistics, in 2012,
the average hysterectomy incidence rate was 179 per 100,000 women, but it was 325 in United States, 318
in Germany, and only 49 in Denmark (Huang et al., 2016; McPherson, Gon and Scott, 2013).
For Asian countries, the incidence rate for South Korea was 198 in 2012 (OECD Health Statistics, 2016).
In Taiwan, with a population of 23 million, an average of 23,000 hysterectomies are performed each year.
From 1999 to 2005, Taiwanese hysterectomy incidence rates varied between 243 and 197 (Huang et al., 2016).
Based on National Health Insurance Data, it is estimated in 2008 that Taiwanese women have a life time
hysterectomy probability of 15.2%; when Taiwanese women become 55 years old, about 11.1% would have
undergone hysterectomies (Huang et al., 2016).
Oophorectomy is the surgical removal of one or both ovaries, ovarian cancer being a primary indication,
and is commonly done by abdominal laparoscopy. Oophorectomy causes the spontaneous menopause onset.
Most patients are advised to start hormonal replacement post operation. The health risks associated with
total oophorectomy are serious women who have had oophorectomies before 45 years old have a mortality
risk 170% higher than those who have not (Parker et al., 2005). Oophorectomy incidence is low. Between 1997
and 2011 less than 2,300 of Taiwanese women between 40 and 50 years old underwent total oophorectomies,
but the corresponding number was more than 10,000 for hysterectomies.
2.2 Disability insurance
In Taiwan, three mandatory social insurance programs provide disability insurance to the working population.
Enrollment is only for the individual, without any family coverage. Labor Insurance is the largest program,
covering nearly 9 million workers in the private sector in 2012. When it was established in 1956, it provided
only health insurance, but by 1978 insured enrollees had coverage for disability, maternity, occupational
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injuries, unemployment, pension, and death; fertility coverage likely started decades earlier than our sample
period of 1997-2011. After 1995, Taiwans National Health Insurance replaced health insurance in Labor
Insurance. The second largest social insurance program is Farmer Insurance. In 2012, this program covered
1.5 million farmers. Government Employee Insurance, the third program, is for public employees and teachers
in public and private schools and colleges. In 2012, Government Employee Insurance covered about 0.6 million
lives. Similar to Labor Insurance, Farmer Insurance and Government Employee Insurance provide a portfolio
of benets, which include disability insurance.3
A woman is eligible for this disability benet if, due to illnesses, she undergoes hysterectomy, total
oophorectomy, and radio-chemo therapy on ovaries before turning 45 years old. Taiwans National Health
Insurance covers most in-patient expenses, so the disability benet is additional to health expense coverage.4
The disability benets are calculated according to an enrollees insurance salary. For Government
Employee Insurance, in 2013 the insurance salary is the lower of an enrollees base monthly salary and
NT$53,900. However, the base salary does not include stipends (e.g. research stipends for college teachers),
so an enrollee in Government Employee Insurance typically has earnings higher than the base salary.5 For
Labor Insurance, in 2013, the insurance salary is dened to be the lower of an enrollees actual monthly salary
and NT$43,900. For Farmer Insurance, the insurance salary is xed at NT$10,200 per month. Disability
benets are 6 months of insurance salary in Government Employee Insurance, and 5.3 months in both Labor
Insurance and Farmer Insurance.
What can be the rationale behind the Taiwanese infertility coverage? In Chinese culture, children often
take care of their parents, so infertility can be likened to a loss of future resources. Besides, infertility likely
adversely a¤ects a womans prospect in the marriage market.Both reasons can be the motivation for the
infertility benet.
3Government Employee Insurance does not provide unemployment insurance. Farmer Insurance does not o¤er
unemployment insurance or pension scheme.
4The co-insurance rate of inpatient services for Taiwans National Health Insurance is 10%, with spending caps.
In 2011, the caps per admission and per year were NT$28,000 and NT$47,000 respectively.
5For instance, the base salary and research stipend for an assistant professor in 2012 was approximately the same,
at NT$41,755 and NT$39,555, respectively.
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Recipients of disability benets are mostly patients who have undergone hysterectomy. Complete oophorec-
tomy is less common, and there are so few radio-chemo therapy cases that we have ignored it. Our research
tests if disability insurance has caused more surgeries. Hysterectomy carries less disutility than oophorec-
tomy, so we expect any e¤ect would be stronger for hysterectomy. As a falsication check, we will study
partial oophorectomy and myomectomy, which do not qualify for disability benet.
3 Data and samples
3.1 Data
Our sample period spans 15 years, from 1997 to 2011. Subjects are females born between 1948 and 1972. We
study their experiences between their 39th and 50th birthdays during the sample period. We use three data
sets. The rst is the set of hospital claims from Taiwan National Health Insurance between 1997 and 2011.
The claims data include all inpatient admissions. Each claim includes a patients demographics (gender and
date of birth), admission date, disease diagnoses, medical reimbursement, and any surgery performed during
the admission. Each claim also has scrambled unique identiers for patients, doctors and hospitals. We
use the surgical-procedure information to identify those who have undergone hysterectomy, oophorectomy,
myomectomy, or partial oophorectomy. We use a patients date of birth and admission date to check whether
hysterectomy and oophorectomy have been performed before the 45th birthday. The infertility benet is
paid once even if both hysterectomy and oophorectomy are performed.
Our second data set is the National Health Insurance enrollment le. The le contains the last entry of
each enrollees insurance program and disability insurance salary at the end of a calendar year. We rst use
an enrollees insurance type to infer the disability insurance salary. National Health Insurance started in
1994 by merging many private and public insurance programs, and its enrollment le has continued to track
enrolleesother social insurance modules. From the enrollment le, we classify subjectsdisability insurance
status into four groups: Government Employee Insurance, Labor Insurance, Farmer Insurance, and otherwise
uninsured.6
6Up until 2002, the National Health Insurance enrollment le contained full insurance enrollment records. From
2003 onward, the enrollment le only contained enrollees last disability insurance record in a calendar year; it no
longer tracks an enrollees disability insurance program changes during the year. For consistency, we use the last
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Next, we obtain enrolleesdisability benet information in the National Health Insurance enrollment le.
National Health Insurance premium is set at a percent of an enrollees monthly salary up to NT$188,000,
which is much higher than the salary caps for disability benets. Therefore, from the National Health
Insurance premium, we can infer an enrollees salary, and, in turn, the benets. This inference is exact for
enrollees in Labor Insurance. Government Employee Insurance uses the base salary, a fraction of the total
salary, for benet calculation, so the enrollees salary in the National Health Insurance enrollment le will
over-estimate the benet. (For this reason, our analysis in Subsection 6.2 will be based on Labor Insurance
enrollees.) The disability benet in Farmer Insurance is xed, so we do not need to use salary information
from National Health Insurance.
Our third data set is from the Survey of Family Income and Expenditure (SFIE), conducted by Tai-
wans Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics. Each year the survey randomly samples
13,000-16,000 households (or about 52,00068,000 individuals) and collects information on socio-demographic
characteristics of each member of the sampled households. For our sample period 1997-2011, we obtain the
following information about female respondents in the 39-49 age group: highest education level, marital
status, number of children by gender, monthly household earnings, and disability insurance type. We then
use the disability insurance type to merge with the enrollment les to control for enrolled population demo-
graphics.
3.2 Samples
We dene our sample in the following way. First, we follow enrolleesdecisions for six years before, and ve
years after, the 45th birthday. Next, we impose a number of restrictions. We remove those in Labor Insurance
whose enrollments were through trade union memberships, because these enrollees could misreport self-
employment income.7 We also delete a small number of enrollees who were in military or welfare programs,
because their access to health services might be di¤erent.
disability insurance record even for years before 2003.
7Labor law in Taiwan requires private companies with ve or more employees to purchase Labor Insurance for
all employees. Self-employed workers or those who work in rms with fewer than 5 employees are not required to
participate, or they can participate through trade unions. Salaries of these workers are often unstable or under-
reported. For the comparison between insured salary and earned salary in various insurance groups, see Lien (2011).
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Table 1: Insurance program changes before hysterectomy
Insurance program in the year of hysterectomy
Insurance program in the year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Total
before hysterectomy Labor Government Farmer Trade Uninsured
Insurance Employee Insurance Union
Insurance
Percentage changes
(1) Labor Insurance 91.94% 0.03% 0.18% 3.54% 4.30% 100%
(2) Government Employee Insurance 0.95% 97.55% 0.06% 0.19% 1.26% 100%
(3) Farmer Insurance 1.66% 0.00% 96.54% 0.79% 1.01% 100%
(4) Trade Union 2.19% 0.01% 0.03% 96.93% 0.83% 100%
(5) Uninsured 5.81% 0.10% 0.64% 6.84% 86.61% 100%
Enrollees with hysterectomies
in di¤erent program (obs.) 67,719 8,920 11,693 53,911 37,748 179,991
Furthermore, enrollees may change social insurance programs through employment changes because of
benet di¤erences. The strategic switch between disability insurance programs creates a selection problem.
For the main analysis we use a sample of enrollees who have never changed their insurance status within
the sample period. We call this the nonswitching sample. The general sample refers to all female enrollees
regardless of any change in insurance programs during the sample period.
Table 1 illustrates the extent of strategic insurance program switches. The table includes insured enrollees
and those covered by trade union memberships, and the uninsured who have had hysterectomies during the
sample period. There are almost 180,000 hysterectomies. For each enrollee, we note her insurance program
in the year in which hysterectomy is undertaken, and her insurance program the year before. Consider the
row under Labor Insurance in Table 1. The number 91.94% is the fraction of all Labor Insurance enrollees
who have undergone hysterectomies under the same program. Only 0.03% of Labor Insurance enrollees have
changed to Government Employee Insurance when they have had hysterectomies the following year; 0.18%
of Labor Insurance enrollees have changed to Farmer Insurance, etc.
Table 1 shows that insured enrollees overwhelmingly have had the same insurance program as the year
before when they undergo hysterectomies. More than 90% of those in Labor Insurance have not changed
the program from the year before hysterectomies; the corresponding numbers for Government Employee
Insurance and Farmer Insurance are even higher, at 98 and 97%. The lower corresponding percentage of
just below 87% for the uninsured likely indicates some strategic changes. Almost 6% of the uninsured have
10











Table 2: Sample censoring and balance
Cohorts Age at 1997 Age at 2011 Years in sample Data at 45th birthday
1948 49 63 left-censored 1 no
. . . . . .
1952 45 59 left-censored 5 no
1953 44 58 left-censored 6 yes
. . . . . .
1956 41 55 left-censored 9 yes
1957 40 54 left-censored 10 yes
1958 39 53 balanced 11 yes
1959 38 52 balanced 11 yes
1960 37 51 balanced 11 yes
1961 36 50 balanced 11 yes
1962 35 49 balanced 11 yes
1963 34 48 right-censored 10 yes
1964 33 47 right-censored 9 yes
. . . . . .
1966 31 45 right-censored 6 yes
1967 30 44 right-censored 5 no
. . . . . .
1972 25 39 right-censored 1 no
become insured under Labor Insurance when they have hysterectomies, and almost 7% have become insured
through trade union memberships. We use the nonswitching sample for the main analysis, and the general
sample for robustness check and social cost calculations.
Our data period is the 15 years between 1997 and 2011. We include female enrollees born between 1948
and 1972 for their experiences between their 39 and 49 birthdays, when these experiences happen between
1997 and 2011. Table 2 presents the birth cohorts and their corresponding ages in 1997 and 2011. The oldest
cohort, those born in 1948, would be 49 years old in 1997, so would only stay in the sample for one year.
They would also have experienced the deadline prior to the data period. The youngest cohort, those born
in 1972, would be 39 years old in 2011. Likewise, they would only stay in the data period for one year, and
they would experience the deadline after the data period. In other words, enrolleesexperiences can be left
censored or right censored. However, for those enrollees born between 1958 and 1962, they would spend all
their 11 years between their 39th and 49th birthdays within the data period between 1997 and 2011. These
enrollees constitute a balanced sample.
In total we use three samples. The nonswitching sample is used throughout. We use the general and
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balanced samples for robustness checks. We use the balanced sample for social cost calculation. Censoring
happens in both nonswitching and general samples, but they have a lot more enrollees. Censoring does not
happen in the balanced sample, but it is much smaller.
Disability insurance is employment based. Employment and job decisions are complex and conscious acts,
so members in our sample have never been randomly assigned. However, the relevant issue is whether the
insured and the uninsured su¤er from uterine and ovarian problems in the same random fashion. If the illness
incidence is uncorrelated between the insured and uninsured, then comparing their behavioral di¤erences is
valid. We are unaware of correlation between employment and the prevalence of medi al problems in female
reproductive organs. For almost 190,000 women in the 2004 U.S. Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance Survey
database, Erekson et al. (2009) nd that women who were unemployed did not have higher odds of having
hysterectomy than women who were employed. More important, as we will show in Figures 3 and 4 below,
the insured and uninsured have similar hazards in partial oophorectomy and myomectomy, which do not
qualify for benets. This is strong evidence that in terms of uterine and ovarian problems, the insured and
uninsured share the same risks.
3.3 Summary statistics
The left half of Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the nonswitching sample in 2000, 2005 and 2010.
The number of subjects ranges from 0.93 to 1.23 million in these years. Because each subject is included
when she is between 39 and 49 years old in that sample year, there is a signicant change in the distribution
of birth cohorts across the years. In 2000, subjects born between 1960 and 1964 account for 17.9% of the
subjects in that year, but those born between 1950 and 1954 account for 38%, and those born between 1955
and 1959 account for the rest. In 2005, the birth-year distribution shifts forward: none were born between
1950 and 1954, but 33.0% were born between 1955 and 1959, with the largest group (45.7%) being born
between 1960 and 1964. For the year 2010, the subjectsbirth-year distribution follows the same forward-shift
pattern.
Table 3 also shows the distributions of the enrolleesinsurance programs in the nonswitching sample. The
percentages of enrollees having Government Employee Insurance are quite stable in the three years, ranging
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Table 3: Summary statistics of female enrollees between 39 and 49 years old
Nonswitching Sample General Sample
2000 2005 2010 2000 2005 2010
Birth year
1950-54 37.7% 0.0% 0.0% 32.3% 0.0% 0.0%
1955-59 44.3% 33.0% 0.0% 46.9% 32.4% 0.0%
1960-64 17.9% 45.7% 29.9% 20.7% 47.2% 34.0%
1965-69 0.0% 21.4% 47.3% 0.0% 20.4% 46.4%
1970-74 0.0% 0.0% 22.8% 0.0% 0.0% 19.6%
Insurance programs
Government Employee 9.6% 10.2% 9.6% 7.3% 7.3% 8.1%
Labor 47.8% 52.7% 56.5% 49.1% 51.3% 55.6%
Farmer 11.7% 9.0% 6.3% 9.7% 7.5% 6.2%
Uninsured 31.0% 28.2% 27.5% 33.9% 33.8% 30.1%
Surgery incidence rate per 100,000
Hysterectomies 766.5 582.8 526.7 702.1 556.2 516.0
Myomectomies 124.2 198.5 273.1 109.9 173.6 234.1
Total oophorectomies 146.2 67.4 55.2 127.4 63.6 57.5
Partial oophorectomies 93.7 246.9 267.3 81.6 220.7 236.3
N (number of enrollees at year end) 931,632 991,952 1,232,835 1,348,413 1,477,946 1,523,745
from 9.6% to 10.2% in the sample. Labor Insurance has the largest share of enrollment, about 50%, in each
of the three years. However, the share of Farmer Insurance enrollments gradually declines over time. This
is likely due to the diminishing and aging farmer population. Finally, the shares of the uninsured females
seem to exhibit a slightly downward trend, declining from 31.0% in 2000 to 27.5% in 2010.
The right half of Table 3 shows the corresponding gures in the general sample. In contrast with
the nonswitching sample, the general sample has a higher percentage of enrollees in Labor Insurance and
uninsured groups. Enrollees in Government Employee Insurance and Farmer Insurance are less likely to
change programs, so their shares become smaller without the nonswitching restriction. Likewise, a higher
percentage of older cohorts can be observed because those enrollees are more likely to switch between
insurance groups (e.g. from being employed to being unemployed and hence uninsured).
The lowest part of Table 3 displays the incidence rates of four surgeries in the nonswitching sample of
women between 39 and 49 years old. Whereas hysterectomy incidence rate fell from 766 (per 100,000) in
2000 to 527 in 2010, myomectomy incidence rates almost doubled in the same time period. This likely indi-
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cates that myomectomy has become a more e¤ective substitute for hysterectomy. Oophorectomy incidence
rates declined over time, but the opposite was true for partial oophorectomy. Better diagnosis and more
conservative treatments may account for these trends (which are also found in the general sample).
4 Econometric methods
Our hypothesis is that an enrollees decision to undergo hysterectomy or oophorectomy may be signicantly
a¤ected by the disability insurance. We test this at a cohort level because we lack data on individual or
household income, marital status, or number of children. However, these data are available from SFIE
for birth cohorts. If individual surgery decisions respond to incentives, enrollees as a group also respond
similarly.
We group enrollees into cohorts by two discrete time scales: i) a natural time scale and ii) the amount
of time from the 45th birthday. The natural time scale is represented by the vector c  (y; s), where y is
a year and s is a season, or a three-month period of the year. An enrollees birthday ts her into a birth
cohort c  (y; s). Our sample consists of female enrollees born between 1948 and 1972, so we have 100 (=
25 years  4 seasons) birth cohorts, with y taking values of 1948, 1949,. . . , and 1972, and s taking values of
1, 2, 3, and 4.
The second time scale measures how much time an enrollee has available before, or elapsed after, benet
expiration. We call the second time scale an enrollees benet quarter, and denote it by the variable q. The
91-day period that begins with the 45th birthday is called quarter 0; the next 91 days is quarter 1; the 91
days before quarter 0 is quarter -1, and so on. Enrollees in our sample are between 39 and 49 years old, so
the benet-quarter variable q takes values -24, -23,. . . , -1, 0, 1,. . . ,19. By making distinctions between year,
season, and benet quarters we allow for more decision variations.
Clearly, the choice of a 91-day length for a time unit, both for chronological and benet dimensions,
is for convenience and practicality. A shorter time length may imply sharper di¤erences between adjacent
cohorts because treatment incidences occur less frequently, whereas a longer time length reduces the number
of groups. (We have also dened the cohort length to be six months, and have veried that results are
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For each birth cohort in a given benet quarter, the hysterectomy hazard is dened to be the ratio of the
total number of enrollees undergoing hysterectomy within this benet quarter to the total number of enrollees
who have not undergone hysterectomy at the beginning of the benet quarter. We dene analogously the
hazards of total oophorectomy, partial oophorectomy, and myomectomy. Hazards are calculated separately
for the three insured and the uninsured groups. For easy presentation, we multiply the calculated hazards
by 100,000. (We do the same for the regressions later.) In Figures 1 to 4, we plot the hazards of the three
insured groups and the uninsured group. The grey curve plots the hazards of the uninsured; the red curve
is hazards of enrollees in Labor Insurance, whereas the blue and green curves are for those in Government
Employee Insurance and Farmer Insurance, respectively. We use a di¤erent scale on the vertical in Figure 1
because hysterectomy hazards are much larger than others.
The four gures show some striking patterns. First, in Figure 1, Labor Insurance and Government
Employee Insurance enrolleeshysterectomy hazards exhibit a sharp increase just before the 45th birthday,
but drop signicantly right after; a similar but less pronounced pattern is in Farmer Insurance. After a few
quarters past the 45th birthday, hazards of all insured return to the same smooth trend. However, hazards
of uninsured enrollees follow a smooth pattern throughout the entire time.
In Figure 2, total oophorectomy hazards follow an increasing trend, but there is no apparent sharp
increase just before the 45th birthday for Labor Insurance and Government Employee Insurance enrollees.
In Figures 3 and 4, myomectomy and partial oophorectomy hazards do not exhibit any abrupt changes.
There is no medical literature to support the pattern of hysterectomy in Government Employee, Labor,
and Farmer Insurances. Adverse uterine conditions cannot be especially serious in the few quarters before
the 45th birthday, but the opposite will happen the few quarters after. Our hypothesis is that such a pattern
is caused by the disability benet expiration when enrollees turn 45 years old.
The hypothesis is consistent with the lack of any abrupt changes in myomectomy and partial oophorec-
tomy hazards. Total oophorectomy indeed qualies for the disability benet before the 45th birthday.
However, the removal of both ovaries carries much higher short-term and long-term health risks than the
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Figure 1: Hysterectomy hazards
removal of the uterus. Because the same benet is paid to both hysterectomy and oophorectomy, we should
expect di¤erent responses.
For hysterectomy, the plots in Figure 1 suggest a timing manipulation e¤ect. Some hysterectomies
may have been moved earlier to qualify for disability benets, a timing e¤ect. There is, however, a more
serious possibility. Some hysterectomies may not have been performed absent the disability benets, an
inducement e¤ect. We estimate these e¤ects in two ways. The rst is based on the di¤erence-in-di¤erence
method: enrollees in the three insurance programs are to be compared to the uninsured, and we estimate
dynamic, quarter-by-quarter e¤ects. The second is a bunching-smoothing polynomial estimation based on
a smoothness hypothesis: there should not be any abrupt changes in enrolleesprobability of undergoing
hysterectomy at the 45th birthday if there were no disability benet. The bunching-smoothing polynomial
method estimates a counterfactual hazard distribution for the insured as if the disability benets were absent.
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Figure 2: Oophorectomy hazards
4.1 Di¤erence-in-di¤erence by benet quarters
We estimate the di¤erence of surgery experiences between the insured and the uninsured, the rst di¤erence.
However, the disability insurance programs have been in place for the entire sample period, so there are no
intervention date or before-and-afterregimes. Theoretically the inducement e¤ect would become relevant
right at individuals labor-market participation. However, reproductive problems that potentially lead to
hysterectomies are uncommon before the fth decade of life.8 We assume that disability benet is irrelevant
due to absence of medical problems until enrollees turn 40 years old. Those years before the 40th birthday
become the beforeregime, while the years after become the afterregime; it is as if disability insurance
intervention happens at each enrollees 40th birthday. The validity of this assumption can be seen in Figure
5: the insured and uninsured have almost identical trends of hysterectomy hazards from 35 to 40 years old
8 In 2008, Taiwan age-specic hysterectomy incidence rates are 541 and 674 (per 100,000 women) for 40-44 and
45-49 year-olds, respectively; these are more than double than those for 30-34 and 35-39 year-olds (119 and 280).
The hysterectomy incidence rate for 20-30 year-olds is less than 40 (see Figure 1 of Huang et al., 2016).
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Figure 3: Partial oophorectomy hazards
(respectively, 40 and 20 quarters to the 45th birthday). To implement this empirical strategy, we have
chosen the 4 quarters between the 39th and 40th birthdays as the omitted benet quarters. We adopt this
assumption on the other three surgeries.
The three insurance groups (Government Employee Insurance, Labor Insurance, and Farmer Insurance)
have di¤erent disability benets, so we use a separate regression for each group. We present the regression
equation for hysterectomy; the regression equations for the other three procedures can be set up analogously:
HInsuredc;q = +   Insured+
19X
i= 20
i  1[i = q] +
19X
i= 20




kj  1[j = T (c)] + "c;q (1)
where c  (y; s) with y = 1948; 1949; :::; 1972 and s = 1; 2; 3; 4;
and q =  24; 23; :::  1; 0; 1; 2; :::; 19:
In equation (1), the dummy variable Insured is set to 1 for an insured group (Government Employee
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Figure 4: Myomectomy hazards
Insurance, Labor Insurance, or Farmer Insurance), and to 0 otherwise. The dependent variable HInsuredc;q is
the hysterectomy hazard (multiplied by 100,000) of the insured or the uninsured of birth cohort c at benet
quarter q, a birth cohort c being dened by birth year y and birth quarter s. The indicator function 1[i = q]
is set at 1 if the condition inside the square brackets is satised; it is set at 0, otherwise. The covariates
Xc;q are cohort-cell means of variables of the total number of children, the number of sons, marital status,
and log household incomes (these data are from SFIE). The function T (c) is used for the data-year xed
e¤ects; T (c)  Int[y + 45 + s=4] is the smallest integer bigger than (y + 45 + s=4), so its range is the years
between 1997 and 2011. Finally, "c;q is the error term. To mitigate serial correlation errors, we implement
standard errors clustered by birth cohorts c  (y; s).9
The parameter q in (1) is the mean hysterectomy hazard di¤erence between quarter q and the omitted
quarters q =  24 to q =  21, those in age 39. The common time trend before age 40 has already been noted
9For details as to why the standard errors of the coe¢ cient estimates of interest tend to be underestimated in the
di¤erence-in-di¤erence model, see Bertrand, Duo, and Mullainathan (2004) and Donald and Lang (2007).
19











Figure 5: Hysterectomy hazards from age 36 to age 45
and shown in Figure 5. Our assumption that inducement begins at q =  20 is conservative, so our estimates
can be regarded as lower bounds. Furthermore, our results change only slightly when the benchmark age
quarters are extended to those quarters for ages from 35 to 39. For q =  20; ::; 19, the parameter q measures
the incremental di¤erence between the insured and the uninsured, our chief focus. If disability insurance
does not a¤ect enrolleeshysterectomy decisions, all estimates of q should be zero.
The inducement e¤ect is the total increment of hysterectomies of the insured over the uninsured in the
period between the 40th and 50th birthdays. Let bq denote the estimate of q. Let nq denote the number




bq  nq. If this measure is zero, we conclude that the disability benet has not
increased the total number of hysterectomies among enrollees.
Next, the timing e¤ect is the total number of hysterectomies that the insured would have undergone after
the 45th birthday absent the benet. If disability insurance incentivizes enrollees to have hysterectomies
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If disability insurance has not favored earlier hysterectomies, then this measure will be zero.
Finally, our analysis is at the birth cohort level, and the dependent variable is hysterectomy hazard of
enrollees born at a certain time. In e¤ect, we use the number of enrollees at every birth cohort as weights in
the estimation. Given that all the covariates within a birth cohort are constant for each enrollee, estimates
obtained from the individual-level regression would be identical to those from the cohort-level regression
(Lee and Card, 2008; Lemieux and Milligan, 2008).
4.2 Bunching-smoothing polynomial estimation
As an alternative, we use a bunching-smoothing polynomial estimation. The assumption is that without
disability benet expiration, there should not be any abrupt hysterectomy-hazard changes at age 45. For
this estimation we have extended the data periods to 40 quarters before and after the 45th birthday, so
these hazards are for ages between 35 and 55. We construct Figure 6 by simulated data for an illustration.
There, the blue curve plots the simulated empirical distribution of hysterectomy hazard of a hypothetical
insured group. It shows the sudden hazard changes around the 45th birthday. To construct a counterfactual
distribution, we imagine that the abrupt changes had not existed. We choose a lower quarter threshold and
an upper quarter threshold, which are denoted, respectively, by qL and qU , with qL < 0 < qU . We then
use hazard data outside of quarters between qL and qU to t an Nth-order polynomial. The tted curve
is then used to predict the hazards between quarters qL and qU . This is the red curve in Figure 6. The
interpretation is that quarter qL marks the beginning of disability insurance impact on hysterectomy before
the 45th birthday, whereas quarter qU marks the end of the impact after the 45th birthday.
We use more observations outside the qL and qU thresholds than the di¤erence-in-di¤erence method for a
better t of the polynomial. The 20-year window of quarter ages doubles the time window for the di¤erence-
in-di¤erence estimation. We augment the sample in the di¤erence-in-di¤erence analysis with enrollment and
surgery records between 35 and 39 years old, and between 50 and 54 years old. These new data are used
even if some enrollees have changed insurance programs between 35 and 39 years old, or between 50 and 54
years old. This is to maintain the same set of enrollees in the bunching-smoothing polynomial estimation as
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Figure 6: Illustrative example of bunching-smoothing polynomial hazard method
those in the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation.




n  qn +
qUX
i=qL
i  1[i = q] + "c;q (2)
where c  (y; s) with y = 1948; 1949; :::; 1972 and s = 1; 2; 3; 4;
and q =  40; 23; :::  1; 0; 1; 2; :::; 39:
In (2), Hc;q is the hysterectomy hazard of birth cohort c at benet quarter q; qn is quarter q raised to the
power n; qL and qU are the lower and upper bounds; and "c;q is the error term. Birth cohorts still range
between 1948 and 1972, as in di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation, but the quarter numbers now are from -40
to 39 because we incorporate more data points. Also, our data period spans 15 years, but we attempt to
track enrolleesexperiences for 20 years, so a balanced sample would be impossible.
Following Kleven and Waseem (2013), we use a fth-order polynomial in the main specication (N = 5).
For each quarter between qL and qU we use a coe¢ cient j to capture the di¤erence between the empirical
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and the counterfactual hazards at quarter q. If disability insurance has no e¤ect on enrolleeshysterectomy
decisions, all estimates of j should be zero.
For each insured group, we use a grid search over the ranges of qL 2 [ 18; 9] and qU 2 [2; 12] to select a
pair of bounds that minimize the root mean squared error of the regression, a common optimality criterion
in econometric models.10 Because each insured group has its own optimal lower and upper thresholds, the
number of estimated coe¢ cients in each insured group is di¤erent. We dene inducement and timing e¤ects
analogously as in di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation. The inducement e¤ect is
XqU
q=qL
bq  nq, where bq is
the estimate of q in equation (2), and nq is the number of enrollees who have not had hysterectomy at the






We present estimation results in graphical plots. Figure 7 plots the entire set of bq, q =  20; :::; 19. The red
plots are for enrollees in Labor Insurance, the blue plots and the green plots are for enrollees in Government
Employee Insurance and Farmer Insurance, respectively. Signicant estimates are plotted with solid dots,
whereas insignicant estimates are plotted with hollow dots. (The scale in plots of estimates for hysterectomy
is di¤erent from those for other surgeries because of its hazard magnitude.)
In Figure 7, for Labor Insurance enrollees, bq starts at almost zero at q =  20, gradually increases,
and becomes signicantly di¤erent from zero (solid dots) at q =  14. Then bq continues to increase as
enrollees age approaches 45, peaks at q =  1 (the di¤erence between the two groups being 193.8 cases per
100,000 enrollees at q =  1) and then sharply declines at q = 0. Most estimates after q = 0 are small and
insignicant. Likewise, the plot of Government Employee Insurance group follows a similar pattern. The
plots of Farmer Insurance group also peak at one quarter before age 45, though the magnitude is only half
10RMSE is a common measure for comparing the performance of di¤erent econometric models or parameter se-
lections. For example, Ichimura (1993) proposes a semiparametric model and compares its RMSE to those of other
models such as the truncated Tobit, binary choice, and duration models. RMSE is also the optimality criterion for
selecting the smoothing parameter in nonparametric estimation methods (Ichimura and Todd, 2007); for selecting the
bandwidth for regression discontinuity designs (Imbens and Kalyanaraman, 2012); and for selecting the polynomial
order of the regression function of regression discontinuity designs (Lee and Lemieux, 2010).
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of the other two insurance groups.
Figure 7: Di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimates bq for hysterectomy
Table A1 in Appendix A presents the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation results (only estimates bq for q
between  10 and 7; most other estimates are insignicant). Each of the three columns in the table shows
separate regression estimates. Due to censoring, the number of observation is 5,280, smaller than one would
expect from a complete sample of balanced data (which would have 25 years  4 seasons  44 birth quarters
 2 insurance status or 8,800 observations).
In equation (1) the parameter  measures the average di¤erence between the insured and uninsured.
The Insured dummy estimate is also in Table A1, and this is signicant. For Labor Insurance and Farmer
Insurance enrollees, their hysterectomy hazards are higher than the uninsured, and this is stronger for Farmer
Insurance than Labor Insurance. For Government Employee Insurance enrollees, this di¤erence turns out
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to be negative. The identication power is not diminished by the sign di¤erences in b because the insured
and uninsured share the same time trend. This can be seen from the insignicant coe¢ cients in the rst few
quarters in Figure 7.
Finally, equation (1) includes a number of controls. In all three equations, enrollees with higher household
income are less likely to undertake hysterectomy, which suggests that wealthier households are less responsive
to nancial incentives. Enrollees with more children tend to have a smaller hysterectomy hazard, though
this e¤ect is insignicant for Government Employee Insurance enrollees.11 Conditional on the total number
of children, the number of sons does not seem to matter. Finally, being married is associated with a higher
hazard, but the estimate is only signicant for the Labor Insurance enrollees. Estimated coe¢ cients from
controls are consistent with common models of health care services.
We now turn to inducement and timing e¤ects. Inducement e¤ect on hysterectomy
X19
q= 20
bq  nq for
enrollees in Labor Insurance is measured at 5,076 hysterectomies. This is about 11.6% of the total 43,845
hysterectomies undertaken by Labor Insurance enrollees between 40 and 49 years old in the sample period.
The standard error of total inducement e¤ect is 857, strongly rejecting the hypothesis of no inducement
e¤ect. In fact, the 95% condence interval for inducement e¤ect is between 6,756 and 3,396, or between
7.8% and 15.4% of the total number of hysterectomies.
The timing e¤ect is
X19
q=0
bq  nq . Generally, hysterectomies have been expedited, so the timing e¤ect
will turn out to be negative. For ease of exposition, we omit the negative sign when we present timing e¤ects.
For Labor Insurance enrollees, the timing e¤ect is measured at 1,008 hysterectomies, or at about 20% of
the inducement e¤ect, with the standard error at 695. Although the value of bq at q = 0 is signicantly
negative for the Labor Insurance enrollees, the overall timing e¤ect is not signicantly di¤erent from zero.
This is probably due to some hysterectomies having been moved earlier to the rst few quarters after the
45th birthday.
In Government Employee Insurance, the inducement e¤ect is measured at 789 hysterectomies, or about
11% of the total hysterectomy cases among Government Employee Insurance enrollees, while the timing
11Studies have shown that the number of pregnancies (or living children) is negatively related to the prevalence of
uterine broids (Ross et al., 1986; Chen et al., 2001).
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e¤ect is 143 cases. We reject the hypothesis of zero inducement e¤ect, but not that of no timing e¤ect. For
Farmer Insurance enrollees, the inducement e¤ect is smaller, at 347 cases, or about 3.8% of all hysterectomy
surgeries among Farmer Insurance enrollees. The timing e¤ect for Farmer Insurance is measured at 283
cases. Neither total inducement e¤ect nor timing e¤ect is signicantly di¤erent from zero.
Regression results on hysterectomy hazards are strong evidence that enrollees respond to incentives
created by the disability insurance program. The di¤erences in inducement and timing e¤ects in the three
treatment groups are consistent with the di¤erences in the three disability insurance programs. Benets of
Labor and Government Employee Insurance are higher than Farmer Insurance.
Figure 8: Di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimates bq for oophorectomy
We now turn to regression results of total oophorectomy, partial oophorectomy, and myomectomy. Almost
all estimates for equation (1) for these surgeries are insignicant. In Figures 8, 9, and 10 we plot the entire
set of estimates of bq for q between  20 and 19, and use the same color convention for the three insurance
groups. It is clear that the disability insurance program has not caused behavioral change. Tables A2, A3,
and A4 in Appendix A presents the estimates (only estimates of bq for q between  10 and 7).
For partial oophorectomy and myomectomy, these insignicant results are to be expected because they are
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Figure 9: Di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimates bq for partial oophorectomy
not eligible for benets. The insignicant result for total oophorectomy is important. Total oophorectomy
and hysterectomy have the same eligibility requirement and benets. However, the health risks and long-
term morbidity of total oophorectomy are much more severe than hysterectomy. The benets are not enough
to change enrolleesbehavior.
5.2 Bunching-smoothing polynomial estimation
Because the bunching-smoothing polynomial method does not rely on the existence of a control, one separate
estimation is done for the uninsured and each of the three insured groups. The number of observation is
4,498 for the Labor Insurance, and 4,474 and 4,481 for the Government Employee and Farmer samples,
respectively. These are smaller than those from a complete and balanced sample because of censoring and
more missing observations when the data are extended to 20 years.
We present regression results with graphical plots and use the same color convention, with the additional
grey plot for the uninsured. Estimates of hysterectomy equation (2) are plotted in Figure 11. In Table A5 in
Appendix A, the four columns list the estimates bq for the uninsured, and the insured in di¤erent programs;
the optimal bounds, qL and qU , are at the bottom of each column. Because each group has its own optimal
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Figure 10: Di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimates bq for myomectomy
bounds, the number of estimated coe¢ cients vary across di¤erent groups.
In Figure 11, the gray line uctuates minimally along the horizontal axis line, so the fth-order polynomial
ts the uninsuredhazard rates quite well. In fact, in Table A5 almost all estimates of bq of the uninsured
are insignicant, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that estimates of bq are jointly zero (F statistics =
1.01). This serves to validate our bunching-smoothing polynomial approach.
For Labor Insurance, most estimates from q =  11 to q =  1 are signicantly positive, followed by
signicantly negative estimates from q = 0 to q = 4; see Table A5. The red plots in Figure 11 show the
spike just before the 45th birthday, and then the drop. The pattern is similar to the di¤erence-in-di¤erence
estimates. The estimated number of induced hysterectomies,
XqU
q=qL
bq  nq, is 4,842, about 11% of total
hysterectomies (43,845). The percentage is slightly smaller than the one (11.6%) estimated by the di¤erence-





bq  nq is 722 hysterectomies, about 14.9% of the total inducement e¤ect; it is
somewhat lower than the corresponding percentage in the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimates. More important,
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Figure 11: Bunching-smoothing polynomial estimates bq for hysterectomy
the timing e¤ect is signicantly di¤erent from zero due to a smaller standard error. This is because the timing
e¤ect for bunching-smoothing polynomial method covers only from zero to six quarters, while the di¤erence-
in-di¤erence method covers up to 20 quarters, many of which have insignicant coe¢ cients.
In Figure 11 estimates bq for Government Employee Insurance enrollees are signicantly positive between
q =  7 and q =  1, but signicantly negative at q = 0 and q = 1; see also Table A5. We obtain the estimated
inducement and timing e¤ects at 756 and 87 hysterectomies, respectively. These estimates are quite close
to the corresponding di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimates (789 and 143 cases). Again, both the zero total
inducement and the zero timing e¤ect hypothesis is rejected.
Finally, in Figure 11, the green curve plots those estimates bq for Farmer Insurance enrollees; bq is
signicantly positive at q =  1 and signicantly negative at q = 0. Compared to Table A1, the estimates
for Farmer Insurance in the last column of Table A5 in Appendix A have fewer coe¢ cients signicantly
di¤erent from zero before age 45. The estimated inducement e¤ect is 280 hysterectomies, which is near the
di¤erence-in-di¤erence value. However, the estimated timing e¤ect is only 60 hysterectomies, much smaller
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than the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimate (283).
From the bunching-smoothing polynomial estimation, inducement and timing e¤ects have larger impacts
for Labor Insurances and the Government Employee Insurance enrollees, but less so for Farmer Insurance
enrollees. However, compared to results of the di¤erence-in-di¤erence method, estimates of the bunching-
smoothing polynomial estimation show a smaller timing e¤ect in the three insurance groups, whereas the
inducements e¤ects are similar.
We now report results of the bunching-smoothing polynomial estimation for total oophorectomy, partial
oophorectomy, and myomectomy. For partial oophorectomy and myomectomy, the fth-order polynomial
achieves a good t, as most bq are insignicant, and the corresponding F-test (all coe¢ cients) is insignicant
for the uninsured group. For total oophorectomy, however, the fth-order polynomial fails the F test (F
statistics = 11.22) and the sixth-order polynomial ts the function better and passes the F test (F statistics
= 0.92). Hence, we present the results from estimating the sixth-order polynomial function. Figures 12,
13, and 14 plot the estimates, and Tables A6, A7, and A8 in Appendix A present them and the optimal
bounds. In Appendix B, we also plot actual (corresponding colors) and estimated counterfactual (dark gray)
distributions for the four surgeries.
The two estimation methods yield very similar ndings. First, for total oophorectomy, which qualies
for disability benets, Figure 12 shows that very few bq are signicantly di¤erent from zero in all insurance
groups. Second, almost all the plots in Figures 13 and 14 (for partial oophorectomy and myomectomy,
respectively) are insignicant for every insurance group. Third, the inducement and the timing e¤ects are
negligible.
6 Robustness checks, benet e¤ects, and social costs
In this section, we investigate inducement and timing e¤ects in more and less restrictive samples, and in
subsamples stratied by di¤erent disability benet levels. Then in the last subsection, we estimate the social
costs due to the disability programs.
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Figure 12: Bunching-smooth polynomial estimates bq for total oophorectomy
Figure 13: Bunching-smoothing polynomial estimates bq for partial oophorectomy
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Figure 14: Bunching-smoothing polynomial estimates bq for myomectomy
Table 4: Comparisons of observations between nonswitching, general, and balanced samples in 2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Nonswitching General sample (2)/(1) Balanced (4)/(1)
Insurance programs sample sample sample
Government Employee Insurance 100,745 107,696 1.07 43,577 0.43
Labor Insurance 522,462 758,909 1.45 218,357 0.42
Farmer Insurance 88,782 111,550 1.26 41,295 0.47
Uninsured 279,963 499,791 1.79 121,014 0.43
Total number of observations 991,952 1,477,946 1.49 424,243 0.43
6.1 Sample without nonswitching restriction and sample without censoring
In this subsection, we use two di¤erent samples. First, we use a bigger, general sample consisting of all
enrollees between the ages of 39 and 49, whether they have switched insurance programs or not. The general
sample allows us to detect bias due to program switches. Our data only allow us to identify an enrollees
insurance status at the end of a calendar year, so we use the end-of-year insurance status for all quarters in
that year. Then, we calculate the hazard rates for the enrollees in each insurance group for each quarter in
the year. Second, we use a smaller, uncensored, balanced sampleconsisting of all enrollees born between
1958 and 1962 (see Table 2).
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Table 4 lists the numbers of observations by insurance groups in the general and balanced samples in
2005. For comparison, we also provide the corresponding numbers in the nonswitching sample. In Table 4,
in 2005, there are a little less than 1 million subjects in the nonswitching sample, but there are more than
1.47 million in the general sample. The general sample is about 49% larger than the nonswitching sample.
By contrast, there are just over 0.42 million in the balanced sample, about 40% of the nonswitching sample.
Among the four groups, the ratios of general sample size to nonswitching sample size is the lowest
for Government Employee Insurance, at 1.07. Government employees appear to have higher job stability.
By contrast, the corresponding ratios of Labor Insurance and the uninsured are higher, at 1.45 and 1.79,
respectively. Enrollees switching in and out of being employed and being unemployed is more common among
those in Labor Insurance than those in either Government Employee Insurance or Farmer Insurance. The
balanced sample consists of enrollees in the nonswitching sample born between 1958 and 1962, so naturally
the corresponding ratios between sample sizes are stable, at about 40% of all insurance groups.
6.1.1 Di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation robustness
In Tables A9 to A12 in Appendix A, we present the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimates of bq of the general
sample for hysterectomy, total oophorectomy, partial oophorectomy, and myomectomy, respectively; Tables
A13 to A16 in Appendix A, correspondingly for the balanced sample. Table 5 presents the inducement
and timing e¤ects from di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimations. Only e¤ects for hysterectomy are included; the
e¤ects for all the other three surgeries are negligible. We include results of the nonswitching sample for easy
comparison.
From the rst three rows in Table 5 for Labor Insurance, the inducement e¤ect in the general sample is
measured at 7,172 hysterectomies out of 61,692; this is about 11.6%. For the general sample, the standard
error of the total inducement e¤ect is 1,458. The inducement e¤ect in the balanced sample is measured at
1,537 out of 13,609, or about 11.3%, with a standard error of 555. The corresponding percentage for the
nonswitching sample is 11.6% (5,076/43,845). Induced hysterectomies as percentages of total hysterectomies
remain stable in these three samples. The estimated timing e¤ects in the three samples of Labor Insurance
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Table 5: Hysterectomy inducement and timing e¤ects from di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Total (2)/(1) Timing (4)/(2)
hysterectomies Inducement e¤ect
Insurance types Sample from 40 to 49 E¤ect
Labor Insurance Nonswitching sample 43,845 5,076** 11.6% 1,008 19.9%
(857) (695)
General sample 61,692 7,172** 11.6% 1,202 16.8%
(1,458) (1,382)
Balanced sample 13,609 1,537** 11.3% 387 25.2%
(555) (1,290)
Government Nonswitching sample 7,262 789** 10.9% 143 18.1%
Employee Insurance (209) (650)
General sample 7,888 885** 11.2% 156 17.6%
(286) (347)
Farmer Insurance Nonswitching sample 9,100 347 3.8% 283 81.6%
(284) (190)
General sample 10,987 241 2.2% 241* 100.0%
(1,418) (110)
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the birth cohort level are in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
are in column (4) of Table 5. We tabulate the timing e¤ect as percentage of the inducement e¤ect in
column (5). The ratios of timing to inducement e¤ects for the general and balanced samples are 16.8% and
25.2%, respectively; these compare with 19.9% of the nonswitching sample. Nonetheless, from column (4),
none of the timing e¤ects is signicantly di¤erent from zero.
For Government Insurance enrollees, from Table 5, the total inducement e¤ect is measured at 11.2% of to-
tal hysterectomy, and the timing e¤ect at 17.6%, whereas the corresponding percentages in the nonswitching
sample are 10.9% and 18.1%. These estimates conrm that results in the general and nonswitching samples
are stable. We do not include the results of the balanced samples for Government Employee Insurance and
Farmer Insurance because the explanatory variables in these small samples exhibit very limited variations.
The last two rows in Table 5 are the summaries of the estimations of Farmer Insurance. The total
inducement e¤ect in the general sample is small, at 241 hysterectomies, or 2.2% of total hysterectomies.
Although the number is even smaller than the total inducement e¤ect of 347 in the nonswitching sample,
the results may be driven by the imprecise estimates of coe¢ cients after age 45. For enrollees in Farmer
Insurance, the inducement e¤ect in the general sample is 2.2% of total hysterectomies, and it is lower than
the 3.8% in the nonswitching sample. For the timing e¤ect, the general sample is about 20 percentage points
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Table 6: Hysterectomy inducement and timing e¤ects from bunching-smoothing polynomial estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total Total (2)/(1) Timing (4)/(2)
hysterectomies inducement e¤ect
Insurance types Sample from 40 to 49 e¤ect
Labor Insurance Nonswitching sample 43,845 4,842** 11.0% 722** 14.9%
(568) (163)
General sample 61,692 6,736** 10.9% 1,053** 15.6%
(785) (214)
Government Nonswitching sample 7,262 756** 10.4% 87** 11.5%
Employee Insurance (108) (28)
General sample 7,888 864** 11.0% 135 15.6%
(185) (136)
Farmer Insurance Nonswitching sample 9,100 280** 3.1% 60 21.4%
(103) (35)
General sample 10,987 319** 2.9% 84* 26.3%
(125) (33)
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the birth cohort level are in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05
higher than the 81.6% (of the inducement e¤ect) of the nonswitching sample.
6.1.2 Bunching-smoothing polynomial estimation robustness
Next, we turn to bunching-smoothing polynomial estimates. We only compare the results of the general
and the nonswitching samples because no balanced sample can be constructed due to the 20-year sample
window. Table 6 summarizes the inducement and timing e¤ects. Estimates of bq for the general sample are
in Tables A17 to A20 in Appendix A. For Labor Insurance, the inducement e¤ect is measured at around
11% of total hysterectomy for both nonswitching and general samples. The timing e¤ects are, respectively,
14.9% and 15.6% of the corresponding inducement e¤ects for the general and nonswitching samples. The
inducement and timing e¤ects are both signicantly di¤erent from zero. These results indicate robustness
of estimates between the general and nonswitching samples.
For Government Employee Insurance, the inducement e¤ects in the general sample and nonswitching
sample are, respectively, 10.4% and 11% of corresponding total hysterectomies. The timing e¤ects in the
general and nonswitching samples are 11.5% and 15.6%, respectively, of inducement e¤ects. These results
indicate robustness. Likewise, for Farmer Insurance, the total inducement e¤ects in the general and non-
switching samples are quite similar, measured at 3.1% and 2.9% of the corresponding hysterectomy, with
the timing e¤ect being 21.4% and 26.3%, respectively, of inducement. Whereas a smaller timing e¤ect is
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obtained from the bunching-smoothing polynomial method, especially for Farmer Insurance, we conrm the
timing e¤ect in most estimates.
6.2 Inducement and disability benet
We now investigate the relationship between benet levels and the inducement and timing e¤ects. This is
an issue pertinent to current policy discussions because the Taiwanese government is considering reducing
disability benets.12 We stratify our sample into 5 groups of increasing insurance salaries with roughly equal
numbers of observations in each group.
The stratication analysis is only on enrollees of Labor Insurance, for two reasons. First, from Table
3, the sample size of Labor Insurance is at least 5 times larger than Government Employee Insurance, and
4 times larger than Farmer Insurance. The large sample size allows us to obtain more reliable estimates.
Second, in contrast with other insurance groups, we have more accurate benet information from Labor
Insurance. We have data of an enrollees (mandated) National Health Insurance premium. Because the
premium is a xed percentage of salaries, we can infer enrolleessalaries. This inference is accurate for those
in the Labor Insurance program. However, public employees often receive stipends, so the inference from
National Health Insurance premium is inaccurate. In Labor Insurance the disability benet is xed at 5.3
months of insurance salary, capped at NT$43,900.
For each of the 5 groups of increasing salaries, we use the di¤erence-in-di¤erence and bunching-smoothing
polynomial methods to estimate the number of induced hysterectomies and the inducement rate, the ratio of
induced hysterectomies to total hysterectomies of enrollees between the ages of 40 and 49. Also, we show the
estimated number of hysterectomies due to the timing e¤ect, and the ratio of timing e¤ect to inducement
e¤ect. Table 7 presents the results, with the di¤erence-in-di¤erence and bunching-smoothing polynomial
estimation results in the upper and lower panels, respectively. Column (1) lists the average disability benets
for the 5 groups. The average disability benet of group 1 is around NT$84,000, nearly one third of the
12Popular discussions have pointed to a link between disability benets and hysterectomies, and pundits have
advocated to reduce infertility disability benets. In response, the Bureau of Labor Insurance has shown a weak
correlation between economic uctuations and numbers of women receiving infertility benets. Nonetheless, no
causality between infertility benets and hysterectomies has been established; see Yeh (2013) for details.
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Table 7: Hysterectomy inducement e¤ects of stratied nonswitching Labor Insurance enrollees
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average Total Induced Inducement Timing Timing
disability benets hysterectomies hysterectomies rate e¤ect rate
Subgroups 40-49 years old (3)/(2) (5)/(3)
D-in-D
1 NT$84,592 8,280 739 8.93% 135 18.20%
(277) (134)
2 NT$100,425 9,145 1,060 11.60% 161 15.17%
(293) (101)
3 NT$133,435 8,722 949 10.88% 233 24.51%
(214) (146)
4 NT$185,197 9,049 1,319 14.58% 119 9.02%
(255) (359)
5 NT$219,500 8,631 1,356 15.71% 167 12.31%
(193) (97)
Bunching
1 NT$84,592 8,280 754 7.11% 40 5.31%
(99) (49)
2 NT$100,425 9,145 854 9.88% 131 15.34%
(162) (74)
3 NT$133,435 8,722 924 9.72% 198 21.44%
(416) (167)
4 NT$185,197 9,049 1,255 16.80% 72 5.74%
(187) (30)
5 NT$219,500 8,631 1,461 14.45% 203 13.89%
(337) (68)
Note: Robust standard errors clustered at the birth cohort level are in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
average benet of the highest group 5 which has an average of almost NT$220,000. The maximum allowed
disability benet is approximately NT$232,600 (5.3  NT$43,900), but the average disability benets of
group 5 is only a little lower than this maximum, so a sizable proportion of enrollees in this group have
actual salaries above the cap.
Columns (2) and (3), respectively, present total numbers of hysterectomies, estimated induced hysterec-
tomies, and standard errors. Total hysterectomies of each group are similar, with the percentage di¤erence
between the highest and the lowest group at less than 10%. By contrast, the variation of induced hysterec-
tomies is quite large among di¤erent benet groups: induced hysterectomies of the highest-benet group
5 are about twice the lowest-benet group 1. Under the assumption that the two inducement e¤ects are
uncorrelated, we use a t-test to reject marginally the hypothesis that the inducement hysterectomy in group
5 is the same as group 1.
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The estimated inducement rates are in Column (4). The inducement rate increases with average disability
benet: the ratio of induced hysterectomies to total hysterectomies increases modestly from group 1 to group
3 (from about 9% to11%), but accelerates from group 3 to group 5 (from about 11% to 15%). The estimated
number of hysterectomies and the timing rates are shown in columns (5) and (6), respectively. On average,
timing e¤ect is small relatively to the number of induced hysterectomies, less than 15% in most groups,
though enrollees in the middle income groups have a rate slightly over 20%. In total, in the di¤erence-in-
di¤erence estimates, the highest benet groups inducement rate is about 75% larger than the lowest income
group (15.71% versus 8.93%). The corresponding results in bunching-smoothing polynomial estimates are
stronger, with group 5s inducement rate being more than twice that of group 1 (14.45% versus 7.11%).
Stratication analysis shows that benets have a strong and positive e¤ect on inducement. Results in
Table 7 shed some light on the possible impact of a policy change.13 The current discussion may recommend
reducing half of the benet. If this were to happen, for group 5 the average benet would drop from
NT$220,000 to NT$110,000, falling between the average benet of group 3 and group 2. At a projected
inducement e¤ect at 11%, this would result in a reduction of more than 4.5 percentage points from the
current inducement e¤ect of 15.71%. If the benet is paid at a xed price, say at the current third tier,
we predict that inducement e¤ects will become stronger among low-income enrollees, and weaker among
high-income enrollees.
6.3 Social costs due to disability insurance
We now estimate social costs due to induced surgeries and disability benet payments. Each induced
hysterectomy qualies an enrollee for benet that would not have been paid. One can plausibly argue that
the benet is a transfer; we are agnostic about the desirability or e¢ ciency of the benet transfers due to
inducement. Each induced hysterectomy is a surgery which uses real resources. Admittedly a hysterectomy
13Our results are di¤erent from those in Ho et al. (2018). They nd that the hysterectomy rate declines as the
benets increase. We suspect three reasons for this discrepancy. First, we di¤erentiate between inducement and
timing e¤ects. Second, Ho et al. (2018) miscalculate the insurance salary of public employees (whose insurance salary
was only a fraction of the full salary due to stipends). Third, women in the farmer insurance also were entitled to
infertility benets and therefore should not be included in the control group.
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Table 8: Estimated social costs of disability insurance (balanced sample)
Total Monthly Total Inducement Inducement
number of insurance number of disability benet surgical
Insurance programs enrollees salary hysterectomies payment in millions cost in millions
Government Employee Insurance 43,577 NT$33,786 2,740 NT$60.543 NT$15.322
Labor Insurance 218,357 NT$31,578 14,946 NT$306.577 NT$89.732
Farmer Insurance 41,295 NT$10,200 2,740 NT$60.543 NT$15.322
Total for three programs 303,229 20,426 NT$427.663 NT$120.376
may yield some short-term and long-term health gains, but we are not in a position to estimate them.14
Here, we calculate separately the inducement costs due to benet payments and surgeries.
We assess inducement costs by the balanced sample (those born between 1958 and 1962) because all
enrolleesexperiences from their 40th to 50th birthdays happen within the data period of 1997 to 2011. We
estimate the social costs of the three programs separately. Inducement e¤ects have only been estimated
for the Labor Insurance balanced sample. However, from Table 5, for Labor Insurance, the inducement
e¤ects for the nonswitching and balanced samples are similar. We believe that the same would hold for the
nonswitching and balanced samples in Government Employee Insurance and Farmer Insurance. Hence, we
simply use the inducement e¤ect percentages in the nonswitching sample.
We estimate the hysterectomy reimbursements from National Health Insurance as follows. In Taiwan
hysterectomies are classied by three broad surgical intensities (total, subtotal, and laparoscopic), as well
as by three levels of teaching hospital characteristics (major teaching, minor teaching, and community).
National Health Administration sets a separate reimbursement rate for each of these 9 hysterectomy classes.
We pick the mid-point, year 2005, for the reimbursement rates. We multiply the number of hysterectomies
in each of the 9 classes by the corresponding reimbursement rate; hysterectomy cost is the sum of these 9
products. Details for the disaggregated numbers of hysterectomies and the 2005 reimbursement rates are in
Table A21 of Appendix A.
Table 8 presents the aggregated data summary and the inducement costs. The rst column lists the num-
14Note also that Taiwanese enjoy national health insurance. Women would have assessed hysterectomy health gains
whether or not they were covered by disability insurance. Hence, induced hysterectomies due to disability insurance
lead to deadweight loss.
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bers of enrollees in the 1958-1962-cohort balanced sample. There are 303,229 enrollees in all three programs.
The second column lists the average monthly insurance salary by programs. For Government Employee
Insurance, the insurance salary is the lower of an enrollees base monthly salary and NT$53,900. However,
National Health Insurance records include base salary and stipends. For disability benet estimation, we
use the average base salary for those who have worked for 10 years. This is NT$33,786 in the 2005 reports
of Government Employee Insurance. For Labor Insurance, the insurance salary is dened to be the lower
of an enrollees actual monthly salary and NT$43,900. Based on the insurance salaries of female enrollees
who underwent hysterectomies, we obtain the average insurance salary per month, NT$31,578. For Farmer
Insurance, the insurance salary is xed at NT$10,200 per month.
The third column lists the numbers of hysterectomies in each and all programs. Estimates of induced
disability benet payment and surgical costs are in the next two columns. Recall the benet is 6 months of
insurance salary for Government Insurance and 5.3 months for Labor Insurance and Farmer Insurance, so
total payment is equal to the monthly amount multiplied by the corresponding months in the program. Then
we multiply the total payment by the inducement rates in each insurance program in Table 5 to obtain the
induced benet payment. We follow a similar procedure to estimate the surgery costs due to inducement.
For the total of over 303,000 enrollees, we estimate a total over NT$427 millions benets payment due to
induced hysterectomies, so it is NT$1,410 per enrollee. We estimate a surgical cost over NT$120 millions due
to inducement, so it is just under NT$400 per enrollee. To give a sense of the magnitude of these numbers,
we nd that the 2016 reimbursement rates for mammogram and pap smear were, respectively, NT$1,245 and
NT$80. Hence, the induced benet payment would be more than enough to fund 1 mammogram, and the
surgery cost due to induced hysterectomy would fund 5 pap smears, for each enrollee.
7 Conclusions
We have studied enrolleesresponse to the infertility coverage in three Taiwanese disability insurance pro-
grams. Enrollees having hysterectomy or complete oophorectomy qualify for benet, but the eligibility ends
at the 45th birthday. This program arguably can be likened to a natural experiment of putting a price on
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the removal of a human organ. Compared to the uninsured, enrollees have about 11% more hysterectomies,
and about 20% of the induced hysterectomies could be classied as those expedited to beat the deadline.
Disability insurance has not led to any increase in oophorectomy.
The contrast between the di¤erent responses in hysterectomy and oophorectomy is striking. The plausible
explanation behind the di¤erence is a cost-benet calculus. Because organ removal is a discrete choice,
economic principle dictates that such an operation is undertaken if and only if the net reward is above a
threshold. If a policy goal is an amount of insurance that would not result in induced operations, then our
results indicate that, in the Taiwanese case, the benet is above the threshold for hysterectomy, but below
for oophorectomy. A policy implication, therefore, is that insurance coverage for infertility should depend
on whether the infertility is due to hysterectomy or oophorectomy.
The ine¢ ciency in health insurance is moral hazard, due to health care cost subsidization. The ine¢ ciency
in disability insurance is excessive claims, due to benets from ling. In the Taiwanese case, the ling for
disability benet claims requires surgeries, which are covered by national health insurance. This has led to
a double moral hazard, and we have found that the cost can be signicant.
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